Hybrid fuzzers combine both fuzzing and concolic execution with the wish that the fuzzer will quickly explore input spaces and the concolic execution will solve the complex path conditions. However, existing hybrid fuzzers such as Driller cannot be effectively directed, for instance, towards unsafe system calls or suspicious locations, or towards functions in the call stack of a reported vulnerability that we wish to reproduce. In this poster, we propose DrillerGO, a directed hybrid fuzzing system, to mitigate this problem. It mainly consists of a static analysis and a dynamic analysis module. In the static analysis, it searches suspicious API call strings in the recovered control flow graph (CFG). After targeting some suspicious API call lines, it runs the concolic execution along with path guiding. The path guiding is helped by backward pathfinding, which is a novel technique to find paths backward from the target to the start of main(). Also, we will show that DrillerGo can find the crashes faster than Driller through experimental results.
INTRODUCTION
Fuzzing is an automatic testing technique that covers numerous boundary cases using invalid data as application input to better ensure the absence of exploitable vulnerabilities [1] . Among several fuzzing techniques, the coverage-guided fuzzing [2] and the concolic execution [3, 4] are notable nowadays. Coverage-guided fuzzing can quickly explore the input spaces and the concolic execution can solve the complex branch constraints. For instance, Driller [5] showed its effectiveness of the hybrid fuzzing in the DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge (CGC) [6] binaries, which generated six new crashing inputs out of 126 binaries that were not possible when running either the fuzzing or the concolic execution alone.
However, sometimes hybrid fuzzers having a coverage-guided fuzzer show a strange behavior. It executes exhaustively the path having no possible crashes because the coverage-guided fuzzer tends to widen the code coverage. If we have a special target line in a huge binary program, this is very awkward. We dubbed this phenomenon a confusion of the fuzzer. We eliminate this phenomenon by providing a guidance to the suspicious target line. In order to give a guidance, DrillerGo first runs a static analysis. After it searches suspicious API calls (target lines) in the disassembled code, it finds paths from the target line to the program start point in the recovered CFG. DrillerGo uses these paths and explores the binary code until it triggers crashes during the dynamic analysis. In order to mitigate a fuzzer's limited code coverage and symbolic execution's state explosion problem, a hybrid fuzzing technique combining the concolic execution, also known as dynamic symbolic execution, with the fuzzing has been proposed. As shown in Figure  1 , it first performs the fuzzing and then runs the concolic execution only when the fuzzer no longer finds a new path. That is, it performs the concolic execution based on the input generated by the fuzzer, and the concolic execution is used to check whether there are other branches which the fuzzer could not explore. Unlike traditional concolic execution, it does not explore into branched compartments, it only solves the constraints and sends the generated input to the fuzzer and it exits. As a consequence, hybrid fuzzing mitigates the problem of the state explosion by reducing calls to the concolic execution and relying on the fuzzing. However, it suffers from a lack of directed properties. If the concolic execution passes the inputs that are not related to the crashes to the fuzzer, it will explore meaningless paths, and a vicious circle will occur, which explores meaningless paths deeply. As a result, the fuzzer's work queue is increased by the number of input values that are not related to the crashes, and this process causes waste of system resources and time. We dubbed this phenomenon a confusion of the fuzzer.
HYBRID FUZZING

DRILLERGO OVERVIEW
DrillerGo reads program binary as an input and outputs crash triggering information as shown in Figure 2 . It consists of three modules; backward pathfinding, the fuzzing, and the directive concolic execution. Backward pathfinding is the core of this system and is a novel technique. It is a static analysis, allows crashes to be triggered quickly, and mitigates the confusion of the fuzzer. We use American Fuzzy Lop (AFL) [2] as DrillerGo's fuzzing engine, which trigger crashes efficiently. Also, we use angr [7] , the nextgeneration binary analysis tool, as our directive concolic execution engine.
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [8] announces known information-security vulnerabilities to the public. It has vulnerability descriptions (e.g., the affected product and version, the type of vulnerability, etc.). We parsed these descriptions and extracted unsafe API function names. Using these, the backward pathfinding module searches their strings in the recovered CFG. If it finds unsafe function names in the recovered CFG, it marks there as a target. For instance, gets() is unsafe function so it can be a target line in Figure 3 . And then, it collects addresses of nodes that call directly a target function and it repeatedly collects addresses of parent nodes until it reaches the start of main() function. These collected addresses will be used by the directive concolic execution module, which informs the fuzzing module a right path to the target line.
After the backward pathfinding module is finished, a dynamic analysis starts to run. The fuzzing module and the directive concolic execution module runs with complementary cooperation, and the directive concolic execution is just a stepping stone to increase the efficiency of fuzzing. Our fuzzing module uses AFL, which performs a grey-box fuzzing [9] technique. The grey-box fuzzing generates input values that cause a new state transition by performing an instrumentation differently from a traditional fuzzing. That is, the generated input values are unique. However, fuzzing suffers from difficult constraints of many conditional branches. In order to solve this, our system runs the directive concolic execution module to trace the input values generated by the fuzzing module. Specifically, it determines the branched compartments that the fuzzing module has failed to enter, solves the constraints, and passes the new input values to the fuzzing module. However, if it solves every constraint of all branched compartments, the fuzzing module will receive all input values which can explore all the paths, but more than a half of them are useless because they are not related to the crash. So we have implemented the backward pathfinding module to prevent this problem. As shown in Figure 4 , DrillerGo solves the path constraint only when the address of the branched compartment is included in the collected addresses that the backward pathfinding gathered earlier. 
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EVALUATION
In this section, we demonstrate the performance evaluation of DrillerGO. First, we evaluated whether DrillerGO triggers a crash faster than a previous system, Driller. Second, we evaluated the code coverage of how many program paths are explored until the crash is triggered. To evaluate our system, we compared it with Driller and selected the CGC dataset as a benchmark dataset. We set the timeout as 24 hours per binary, and terminated the system if a crashing input was found. Time-to-Exposure (TTE) measures the length of the fuzzing campaign until the first test input is generated that exposes a crash. And we gave a same string ("fuzz") as the initial input to both systems because the initial input makes a big performance difference to the fuzzer. We conducted our experiments on a machine with a 3.5 GHz Intel(R) Core i7-7800X CPU and 64GB of RAM. We used the Ubuntu 16.04 LTS version. Our experimental results are shown in Table 1 . Most of Driller's TTE is greater than DrillerGo's in Table  1 . This means that DrillerGo finds a first crashing input than Driller. In order to calculate how much DrillerGo finds a crash faster, we calculate time efficiency. The formula to calculate time efficiency is:
Where F i is time efficiency, T syst em is TTE of system. In Table 1, the most improved result is on CROMU 00023 binary, where DrillerGo finds a crash 2.37 times faster than Driller.
We also measure total-of-paths (TP), which means the code coverage. TP is the number of paths found by a fuzzer. In Table 1 , Most of DrillerGO's TP is smaller than Driller's. This means that DrillerGO doesn't spend its execution time to widen the code coverage but concentrates on exploring the path which guides to the target line. As a result, DrillerGo shows better performance than Driller because finding a crash more quickly is important in a directed fuzzing technique.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
In this poster, we propose DrillerGO, which is a directed hybrid fuzzing system. Our system has a novel method, backward pathfinding, which prevents the confusion of the fuzzer. We also show that DrillerGo finds a crash more quickly than Driller. However, it has a heavy-weight concolic execution engine and cannot perform an analysis on binaries that do not have a suspicious API function name. We will research these shortcomings. First, we will apply a light-weight and speedy symbolic execution engine, QSYM [10] to mitigate DrillerGo's overhead for a concolic execution. Second, we will study cases that don't have suspicious API calls.
